



**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

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**EXPANDING CONSENSUS FOR AMERICA'S ARMY**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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This document describes a strategy for the Army to compete for dwindling resources to ensure its ability to deter or defeat foreseeable 21st century adversary[ies]. This document's content is offered to provide a concept for competing in a draconian environment in which competition from the National Guard Bureau, the Navy, and Air Force must be addressed. If this unhealthy competition isn't addressed, in the opinion of this author, it is not a question if disaster will occur, but when.

Included is a contrarian's view why the '2 MTW' scenario should remain the minimum premise for force structure decisions of all services, an overview how to 'triangulate' the Pentagon, and most importantly, a proposal to terminate the *pyrrhic* battle between the Active Army (RA) and the Army National Guard (ARNG). Competing for defense funds is always tough, but for the Army an almost unnecessary exercise for an entity easily defined as the 'roadblock' in the Fulda Gap. Almost overnight, the Army has learned that it has become a brutal, 'zero sum' exercise. The Army's leadership must commit itself to this fray to demand increased efficiency, reduce redundancies, and furthermore, become adept at an oblique-like analysis of its required capabilities. It should openly question any decision to purchase an array of *Nimitz* carriers, *Aegis* cruisers, F-22s, Joint Strike Fighters, and additional F-18 Hornets to defeat adversaries who cannot defeat the ships and aircraft already available. It is this ranking of priorities which results in relevant, immediately needed programs being delayed and canceled.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iii
PREFACE .....	vii
THE ARMY AS THE LINCHPIN OF A LETHAL, JOINT FORCE.....	1
REVALIDATING THE TWO 'MTW' SCENARIO.....	4
REINVENTING THE MILITIA.....	11
CONCLUSION.....	16
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	17
ENDNOTES.....	21
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	23



## PREFACE

The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance of Dr. Walter B. LaBerge, Ph.D., regarding the validity of the "2 MTW" scenario<sup>1</sup>, and Colonel Uldric L. Fiore, Jr., JA, USA, regarding proposals to reduce the bureaucratic overhead generated by the Service Secretariats<sup>2</sup>.

There exist numerous initiatives to improve the costs of operating an unbeatable Army<sup>3</sup>. These include freeing more funds for 'leap ahead' research and development, accelerated delivery of new systems, and a top-driven, earnest 'zeal' to drastically reduce overhead. These savings can only be accomplished by eliminating inefficient procedures and significant portions of the present defense bureaucracies.<sup>4</sup>

To ensure America's Army remains the unquestioned, dominant 21st century ground force, conceptual changes must occur. The Army's leadership is confronted by significant obstacles from a domestic-focused administration, a Congress overly cognizant of contractor campaign contributions and local payrolls generated, and worst, internal turmoil within its components<sup>5</sup>. These obstacles make it difficult to match objectives with resources and absorb expensive deployments from an obsolescent resourcing paradigm.

It is important the Army be included in, as in the words of Lieutenant General (Retired) William E. Odom, "the right technology fix." Specifically, the selection of which technology to exploit should not perpetuate the obsolete requirements of the Cold War. The Soviet threat, upon which the requirements for carrier battle groups and large attack submarine fleets were premised, does not exist. While the bulk of the Soviet Navy rusts, unable to sustain maintenance, the U.S. Navy grudgingly resists even the most token reductions. It continues in its efforts to maintain relevance by placing stealth fighters on new 5 billion dollar *Nimitz* carrier[s] and a theater high altitude missile defense system on expensive, yet vulnerable *Aegis* cruisers. These systems, successors in interest to the dreadnoughts sank in training exercises in the early 1920s, are likely as vulnerable. The Air Force, the market maker in the contractor cornucopia of recent years, persists in its efforts to refurbish B-1 bombers (of dubious value even when first purchased in the mid 70s) or add B-2s (which are yet to ratify their price tag), while relegating to a secondary priority the moderate expansion of a modern air transport fleet of C-17s.<sup>6</sup>

All of these decisions continue despite most recent American interventions featuring the Army, and more specifically, its special operations, logistics, and medical advisors. It was the Army which was the focal point of peacekeeping or peace enforcement in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. Finally, world events suggest that future involvements will continue to require a formidable ground presence with, at best, an intermittent requirement for extensive available air or naval firepower.

It is popular, if not politically expedient, to account for this funding shortfall as deference to an elected executive and legislature engrossed in domestic economic policy. In a more cynical vein, the paradigm is a monument to an idyllic view which mandates blind concurrence to the spirit of 'jointness' even when this spirit will result in a dangerous loss of capabilities. As a

result, important research and delivery of essential technologies have been delayed, prematurely curtailed, or canceled in favor of obsolescent systems, munitions, and irrelevant force structure.

Internally, Army initiatives have been hampered in part because of development strategies which have left it vulnerable to delays and technology failures. These problems are depicted by the cancellation of the Sergeant York air defense system, the delay occasioned by an unsuccessful attempt to develop a one crew served Comanche helicopter, and the funding slow down with theater high altitude anti-missile defense system.

Finally, a waste of critical resources continues as a result of the disagreement over force structure, missions, and training decisions among the Regular Army ('RA'), the ARNG, and the Army Reserve (USAR). This waste has been precipitated by the funding of excess force structure, known by all parties to be mismatched by skill or not required<sup>7</sup>. Every fiscal period these mismatches and structural 'obesity' that remains ignored only exacerbate an already serious problem. It is essential, if not critical, that all parties unite<sup>8</sup> or effect an amicable divorce and make their own way independently. All services must transform traditional, but possibly irrelevant, force structures to ones capable of swift mobilization and prompt delivery to a danger area. Reserve Component forces, not mobilized and assimilated into active duty forces, must be capable to provide for the homeland defense in the air, at all borders, and in the maritime areas buffeting our shores. Most important to these solutions is one which will assimilate the skills and systems of a Navy requiring shrinkage.

## THE ARMY AS THE LINCHPIN OF A LETHAL, JOINT FORCE

The Army, as contrasted with the historically all-volunteer forces maintained by the Air Force and Navy (Marines), is the military entity most representative of the American populace. Beginning as a militia, and later a militia supplemented by a regular full time force, it has only recently (last 50 years) become an active-duty, dominated entity. There now exists substantial pressure to return the primary focus of the Army to that of a militia force. Senior leaders of the National Guard Bureau ('NGB') and its lobbying arm, the National Guard Association of the United States ('NGAUS'), often correlate this 'return' by relating what they describe a historical predisposition against the maintenance of a standing Regular Army. The original colonists did indeed possess a predisposition against housing British soldiers whose presence enforced unpopular taxes.

The Army has always been on the front of social change while being capable of winning the nation's wars. As valuable as the Navy, Marines, and the Air Force have been in prior conflicts, it was a fledgling Army, operating without a Navy capable of defeating a massed British Navy which triumphed in the Revolution. It was the Army which dealt another decisive defeat to the British at New Orleans, stormed the walls of Chapultepec resulting in a conclusion to 'manifest destiny', and laid successful sieges at Vicksburg and Petersburg. It was the Army that guaranteed the safety of person and property in the Western territories in the late 19th century. It was the Army which turned the tide for the Allies in the stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front in World War I and brutally battered the combined forces of the Axis in World War II. Finally, it was predominantly an Army force which routed the allegedly battle-hardened Iraqi Army in one hundred hours. Most recently, it has been the Army which has been

the enforcement agent of the international community to restore democracy or enforce security in the Sinai, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia.<sup>9</sup> Also important to the Army's legacy is it being the first military force, if not the primary federal government agency, in addressing such social issues as the integration of women and minorities into its ranks, promoting education and leadership training in both its service academy and in land grant colleges, and conducting research and discovering cures for serious diseases.

Summarized, the Army is supported by 4% of the national budget, but comprises a force which has suffered the brunt of the casualties in all previous conflicts. Accordingly, a consensus must be reconstructed which provides sufficient resources to ensure future conflicts are concluded victoriously while still incurring minimal casualties. In a postwar scenario, the Army must also remain prepared to be a stabilizing entity to enforce a hard won peace. In fact, almost all uses of the military following the cessation of hostilities in OPERATION DESERT STORM have been primarily focused on Army ground forces. While this nation's political and military objectives are accomplished in a joint relationship with the Navy, Marine Corps, and a lethal Air Force, it is the Army which is charged to destroy any remaining ability by an adversary to continue hostilities and restore stable governments. In sustaining its competencies, the Army has become locked in the 25% 'mediocrity spiral', or its traditional share of the total Defense Department (DoD) budget. In his book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, expressed his dismay that regardless of world events, the Army always received 23 % of DoD's budget. General Taylor stated,

"The maintenance of the rigid percentage distribution by service of the budgets since 1953 is clear proof of the absence of flexibility in our military preparations. This frozen pattern could only be justified if the world had stood still since 1953 and I doubt that anyone would say that it has."<sup>10</sup>

More aptly, it is a problem highlighted by an unwillingness of the nation's senior civilian leadership to understand that 21st century warfare and peacekeeping cannot be successfully concluded by an Army trapped in a 1960s budget equation of fixed percentages of defense spending. Nor can it be won by an array of aircraft, smart munitions, and a ground force composed mainly of a part time militia.

This advocacy is not without peril. In a story contained in the *Army Times*<sup>11</sup> a senior DoD official 'discouraged' Army leader[s] from articulating the condition of the entity. This official's reaction was a response to comments made by one leader in a February 3, 1998 *Wall Street Journal*<sup>12</sup> article. He was upset that Army leader[s] had apparently abandoned a long held policy to not overtly lobby for its agenda.<sup>13</sup> In fact, the attempt to chill the discussion was a tacit corroboration that the Army leader's assertions were accurate. This chilling of discussion harkens to another era when an Army Air Corps Officer named Billy Mitchell was publicly humiliated because he had the audacity to portray the heavy cruiser and battleship as vulnerable without air cover, and would soon be secondary in importance to the newly-developing aircraft carrier technology. In truth, carriers and other surface support ships may be as vulnerable to a dedicated pilot[s] flying a MiG or Mirage armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles, as the Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941. In essence, the Army leader stated what has been whispered for some time; specifically, that a consortium comprised of legislators, contractors, and senior leaders of other services have advanced the imprudent procurement of weapons systems for dubious or unverified reasons.<sup>14</sup> This Army leader's irritation was that the combat system of decision, the ground soldier, remains critically undersourced, and the basis for this shortfall was the continuing priority given the procurement and sustenance of ships and tactical aircraft. Simply, the Navy and Air Force have sufficient, dominant numbers of technologically superior

ships and aircraft for the near term and the foreseeable future. It is this lack of resources occasioned by decisions to purchase these ships and aircraft, admittedly superior to the ones replaced, which has caused this impending condition.<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, the question is begged: why replace superior existing systems and leave lacking or substantially delayed research and new systems which reduce the vulnerabilities of the Army ground soldier? This question is especially appropriate when recent world events indicate that a substantial portion of future military involvement will include the continual deployment of peace keepers comprised mostly by Army soldiers.

## **REVALIDATING THE TWO 'MTW' SCENARIO**

It is vogue in the changing strategic environment to validate force structure reductions premised on the lack of probability of a two, almost simultaneously conducted, major theater war (2 MTW) scenario.<sup>16</sup> Proponents contend that by eliminating the 2 MTW premise, there exists no credible basis the U.S. could be confronted by two (or more) such adversaries acting in a coordinated fashion. Thus, proponents conclude that the sustenance of force structure to meet this dual threat is not justified.<sup>17</sup> They focus exclusively on the economics of sustaining current forces, not on the historical precedent or likelihood of the scenario. Simply, the detractors of the 2 MTW premise commence from a predisposition to flatten or reduce resources and ignore current events and historical precedent.

This nation's policies and conduct of military operations are replete with examples to validate the 2 MTW premise as a starting point for the selection of force structure and division of resources. The first two wars conducted by a youthful United States, the Revolution and the War of 1812, were concluded successfully not by the battlefield superiority of its Army and Navy, but

by Great Britain's inability to conduct a 2 MTW. In each instance, the undeveloped United States was no match for the military of almost any European country, let alone Great Britain. In each instance, the British engaged in an almost simultaneous war with France and were unable to defeat the Americans who fought with a militia Army and an almost privateer premised Navy. Revisionists who have described these early successes in ideological terms. It is questionable whether George Washington, John Paul Jones, or Andrew Jackson would have generated the same results had they either faced troops which defeated Napoleon's Grand Armee, or a naval force comparable to Lord Nelson's at Trafalgar. What would have been the result if the French Navy had not been able to enforce the blockade which ultimately compelled Lord Cornwallis to surrender at Yorktown? Or even less speculatively, what would have been the result had a first echelon British Commander not allowed a routed American Army to escape New York City in the early years of the Revolution? In summary, the United States probably owes its very existence to Great Britain's inability to sustain a 2 MTW scenario.<sup>18</sup>

In the past fifty years, the U.S. has been engaged by three sets of adversaries who could not singularly defeat the United States but who have used, by design or by accident, the 2 MTW scenario. This strategy has provided our nation's adversaries military advantages, and in two instances, led to a 'tie' (Korea) and a media-defined 'loss' (Vietnam). In fact, two sets of adversaries, and arguably a third, have **successfully** used this same strategy before attempting it against the United States.

First, the Japanese used internal discontent within Czarist Russia to engage and destroy the Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Later in the century, remembering the strategy's success, the Japanese High Command used the U.S.'s distraction with the war in Europe to preemptively attack Pearl Harbor. It was thought that the destruction

of the Pacific Fleet might quickly force the U.S. to negotiate quick end to hostilities. Only the opportune absence of the Pacific Fleet's carriers prevented the strategy from being completely executed. As it was, the initial success by the Japanese arguably resulted in a protracted struggle costing hundreds of thousands of additional casualties and billions in revenue.

Second, after witnessing an apparent lack of American resolve to guarantee Chang Kai-shek's government on Mainland China while simultaneously facing the arrayed might of the Warsaw Pact in Europe, the Red Chinese 'authorized' their North Korean 'surrogates' to attack the Republic of Korea. Despite horrific casualties, U.S. forces eventually turned the tide of battle. But the same omnipresent Warsaw Pact threat, combined with a publicly stated strategy that no action would occur north of the Yalu River, arguably encouraged a second attack consisting of Chinese 'volunteers'. This Chinese attack resulted in the stalemate which exists even today. As a result, our nation's inability to engage in an extended 2 MTW resulted in our nation's first wartime "non-victory".

Third, Ho Chi Minh's and General Giap's assessment that an economically beleaguered, post World War II French government could not sustain control over its Indochina colony was proved correct at Dienbenphu. Sparked by this initial success, Comrade Ho and General Giap pursued a relentless offensive strategy against the Diem government in South Vietnam and its U.S. guarantors. Their confidence was premised on several strategic facts. First, they knew they were facing a corrupt government headed by President Diem. Second, they suspected Diem's U.S. guarantors were politically, economically, or militarily overextended by the Warsaw Pact. Third, they correctly surmised that American leaders perceived no conflict could be resolved against a contiguous Red Chinese-supplied surrogate (without the political will to use nuclear weapons). Finally, they speculated that the American populace would withdraw its political

support if it perceived another Korean 'no win' strategy was recurring. Again Ho and Giap were correct. The fall of South Vietnam ratified the soundness of using a 2 MTW scenario against a superior adversary.

Finally, an examination of the scenario leading to and including the Gulf War, as well as the current situation in this same geographic area, should cause one to conclude that Saddam Hussein, Kim Chong Il, their military and technology sponsors, the Peoples' Republic of China ('PRC'), and possibly rogue, non-state elements within the states comprising the former Soviet Union are employing the 2 MTW strategy. One only has to review Saddam's list of military and scientific suppliers (specifically, the PRC and PRK) to make a plausible argument that the 2 MTW strategy is already in its preliminary stages. One has to wonder that had *OPERATION DESERT STORM* not been so quickly conclusive, instead deteriorating into thousands of chemical and biological deaths beamed in real time by the mass media, could it have been so absurd that Kim Chong Il would not have unleashed his Army to conquer South Korea? By publicly disavowing an ability to sustain a 2 MTW scenario, it follows that U.S. leaders are banking that every initial conflict will be as promptly terminated as *OPERATION DESERT STORM*. Even worse is the scenario that following an American victory with a first aggressor, a second despot would still initiate a hostile foray knowing American forces to be overextended and the American populace unwilling to accept additional carnage.

It may be easy to presume President Bush would have turned to the nuclear 'trump card' to win the day by its use or threat, but can it also be concluded that he would have enjoyed the same discretion enjoyed by President Truman in our mass media-conscious society? It should be remembered that *DESERT STORM* occurred only 23 years following Walter Cronkite's commentary that a failed *Tet* offensive had turned the tide against the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Today, Saddam Hussein rebuilds his country's infrastructure and armed forces for the apparent purpose of conducting regional expansion. He sees most of his former coalition antagonists in disarray, with many staging bases used successfully in 1991 now denied to his primary adversary. He can read widely distributed publications as to the specifics of the U.S. post-Gulf War drawdown and possible reductions in its military capabilities. Like an attorney retrying a case after it has been reversed on appeal, Saddam and his generals now possess knowledge from failed strategies and mistakes. Their apparent control over Iraq's populace remains strong. It is reasonable to surmise that a second attack on Kuwait would be continued by also attacking Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). Upon solidifying his position after overrunning Saudi Arabia and possibly the U.A.E., Saddam could offer a cooperation pact with his former Iranian antagonists and use as political 'bait' their joint military abilities, short supply lines, and a literal choke hold on the world's economy through their own and captured oil reserves.

It is alarming to note that former (and current) punitive economic remedies utilized against the Iraqi economy would be moot if Saddam were to ally himself with the Iran's Shiite government and their alliance were to control the flow of Kuwaiti, Saudi, and U.A.E. oil as well as their own. The United States would be in a precarious position to not only have to rely on their own domestic production and its stored reserves, but it would be in a conflict which might extend 8-12 months. As a result, the U.S. might have to divert other stocks through military means or pay greatly inflated prices from non-Arab countries which supply Western Europe and Japan. Combined with the armed belligerence of Saddam and his allies, this economic action would certainly strain, if not break, many diplomatic relationships this country has sought to nourish over the past fifty years. More frightening would be the result that a combination of Iranian, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi oil reserves alone approximates one-third of the known world oil

reserves as late as 1992. Add the reserves from a captured Saudi Arabia and/or the United Arab Emirates the controlled oil reserves represented would exceed **TWO-THIRDS OF THE WORLD'S ENTIRE KNOWN RESERVES!**<sup>19</sup> It is reasonable to conclude that if Saddam possessed the necessary audacity to attempt another attack on his neighbors, he would not halt his forces after taking Kuwait. Instead, would continue the assault. He would know his attacking forces would be subject to air strikes from Saudi Arabia by the United States and other former Gulf Coalition allies, but if he took the entire Arabian peninsula he might either capture a portion of these aircraft or force them to more remote base locations. If successful, he would temporarily limit the counterattacking air forces to those, in all likelihood, launched from carriers. From captured bases on the Saudi peninsula, Saddam and his Iranian allies could direct their own counter strikes against these forces. For the United States and its allies, they would be in a position to risk substantial capital ships to aggressor aircraft and surface to surface anti-ship missiles. No expert would dispute that the price to Saddam and his Iranian allies might be high, but if any of their aircraft's anti-ship missiles scored a hit on an American carrier or cruiser, they may then view the rewards of such an adventure as sufficient. The prospective loss of a ship[s], aircraft, and a significant number of American lives might generate a result similar to ones seen after *Tet* or Mogadishu. Experts might differ with this conclusion, but they should be reminded that *Tet* was a military defeat for the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese and that 18 American soldiers were lost in Mogadishu compared to an estimated 6-700 Somali casualites. Although both engagements were technically military victories, both events broke the will of the American populace to continue these involvements.

At some juncture, PRK's leader, Kim Chong Il, could be expected to unleash his horde in an attack that has been planned and tested by exercises for almost fifty years. As in November

1950, principally ground-based U.S. forces might fight bravely and extract a high toll on the aggressors, but they would probably be drained logistically due to a concurrent buildup in Southwest Asia. The President, Congress, and the populace would again face decisions regarding the morality of using nuclear weapons, might figuratively 'blink', and withdraw. What the Soviet military behemoth could not accomplish in the forty five years of the Cold War, a combination of comparable 'lightweights' might actually execute.

Having abandoned an ability to conduct and successfully terminate a 2 MTW scenario by significant ground force reductions, our nation's leaders would only then realize their ability to wage a two front, conventional war depended on a Maginot Line of *Nimitz* carriers, *Aegis* Cruisers, F-22s, and Joint Strike Fighters. Technological supremacy in ships, aircraft, and digitization would all factor into our forces being overwhelmed just as surely as Leonidas' 300 Spartans were overwhelmed in the pass at Thermopylae.

It is also reasonable to conclude the threat of the combined Russian and Chinese nuclear force might eventually occur as a checking mechanism against any American President who sought to rehabilitate overextended, under supplied ground forces with a limited nuclear strike. Regardless of the eventual decision, the result would prove to be one of the bloodiest debacles ever. It would have been generated by the unwillingness to preserve the 2 MTW basis to properly structure the nation's defense.

## **REINVENTING THE 'MILITIA'**

The most damaging and divisive issue facing Army leadership is the controversy regarding mix of force structure among the RA, the USAR, and the National Guard.<sup>20</sup> Many Guard positions are supported by the other parties. As a result, it should be expected these other

interested parties will eventually decide to exploit the controversy into a feeding frenzy to claim the resources purportedly saved by transferring combat power to the 'part time' ARNG. Inevitably, this decision could cripple the overall combat capability of the Army.

Having first reacted with silence, then vocal disbelief, and now with hastily composed plans for ARNG integration directly into RA entities, RA leaders are trying to stem the political tide. The prior legislative year saw the NGB's efforts culminate with a well coordinated congressional campaign to elevate the Chief, NGB, to 4-star rank and place him into a 'peer' position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although repelled in its first attempt, the Guard and its powerful lobby are not only preparing to renew these initiatives, but have even 'raised the stakes' with additional enhanced legislation.<sup>21</sup> Combined with the fear of an 'alternate' Army 4-star on the Joint Chiefs who might openly disagree with the RA leadership and possibly support Navy and Air Force initiatives, the Army's leadership is torn between responding to these initiatives as irresponsible and/or disclaiming their recent, positive assessments of ARNG combat units.<sup>22</sup>

Belatedly, Active Army and USAR leaders have discovered the Guard's political might, allied with assistance from the Air Force and Navy, may possess a reasonable opportunity for adoption. In fact, Army leaders have been forced to reverse course and delay force structure reductions attributable to the ARNG.<sup>23</sup> Such a turn of events could effectively make the Army a 'billpayer' for *Nimitz* carriers, *Aegis* cruisers, the F-22, and the Joint Strike Fighter.<sup>24</sup> Army leaders have also had to privately admit that the 'bill payer' label may also serve the interests of the administration and an eager Congressional consensus who see a balanced budget as the top national priority. A smaller, albeit 'hollow' Army, might be the result. Adding to this climate is an Air Force anxious to support its high cost addition of the F-22. Even more covertly lurks the Navy, ever-ready to build carriers, cruisers, F-18s, surface vessels, and desirous of additional

missions for its Marine ground arm. The Air Force and Navy, while publicly hesitating to endorse Army force structure reductions, may privately support them for the alleged savings provided and because they believe that a robust Marine Corps can fill any shortfall created by a ARNG-heavy Army.

While these initiatives provide a euphoria to the Guard and the Marines, it would constitute a dangerously reduced combat force. The ARNG cannot duplicate the immediately available lethality found in 10 or more Active Army divisions. The advocacy of the Guard's lobby and the optimism of Marine leaders cannot transform illusion into reality. Although this result may appeal to the administration, sound profitable to contractors and academically sound to analysts, it is delusion.

This odd array of political allies with their menu of air weaponry and 'smart' munitions is overconfident in believing it can easily defeat a motivated, well trained, adequately equipped, coalition of adversaries consisting of some combination of the PRC, PRK, Russia, or even a bloc consisting of Iran/Iraq/Syria/Libya if the nation's defense lacks a robust Army. A combination of these countries' strength through oil revenues could present a credible opponent. Oil revenue could be used to purchase North Korean and Chinese technology, weapons of mass destruction, and encourage an incursion into the Republic of Korea. Not only would an immediately available Army be required to coordinate an aggressive defense and subsequent counterattack, but it would have to accomplish these objectives and replace some or all of the governments of Khaddafi, Assad, Hussein, the Mullahs of Iran, and the North Korean governments. This rebuilding task would dwarf the task faced in 1945 Europe and Japan. Although a governmental structure might already exist in South Korea which could assimilate a defeated North Korea, the prospective challenges to pacify, rebuild, and install stable governments in these other former

adversaries would be more difficult than faced by General McArthur in post war Japan. It is likely that each of these countries would possess residual, religiously motivated 'partisan' elements which might continue hostilities. An occupying force, heavily laden with USAR civil affairs and psychological operations personnel, could only be maintained as a part of a strong occupying force of the RA.

Having conceded the Guard's initiatives possess political merit and additionally conceding that an Air Force equipped with F-22s and B-2s and a Navy brimming with new F-18s, JSFs, *Nimitz* carrier[s] and *Aegis* cruisers would constitute a 'best case', an over dependence on these systems at the expense of a robust Army represents a high risk scenario. To prevent this result, new solutions must encompass additional savings gleaned from reductions in DoD bureaucracies and more specifically, the respective service Secretariats. Prudent, jointly coordinated purchases of leap ahead technology must be effected, but most importantly, an efficient, realistic plan to utilize the combat capabilities of the ARNG and to refocus its political efforts must occur. A Naval Militia, commanded by the Chief, NGB, could be used to initiate this refocus and preserve costly, naval competencies. Such an expansion of the NGB could provide the following advantages -

a. the creation of a maritime, ground, and air interdiction force that is manned by personnel not constrained by *Posse Comitatus*, capable of providing a force no nation state or criminal cartel could defy, let alone defeat. Combined with a congressional declaration of 'war' by naming specific Mexican, Central, and South American drug lords and cartels as 'enemies of the nation' would automatically make cooperation, assistance, and corrupt involvement with these persons/entities by any soldier, airman, seaman, or marine on active duty, arguably guilty of *Aiding the Enemy*.<sup>25</sup> This offense, already possessed of very strong general-deterrent penalty,

e.g., death, under the jurisdiction of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice ('UCMJ')<sup>26</sup>, would provide an additional penalty for those on active duty who would place pecuniary gain before the nation's security and welfare. Drug traffickers intercepted by this force on the open seas or international airspace could have their aura of glamorous invincibility shattered.

b. The addition of a Naval Militia to the ranks of the NGB would provide a credible premise for the 4-star, JCS billet sought by their NGAUS lobby<sup>27</sup>. Specifically, it could provide an economic basis to amortize an existing investment in carrier battle groups and provide a total joint force structure for the Chief, NGB to perform as the Commander charged with domestic land, sea, and air defense. It could provide the Guard a basis to validate its desired role as the primary (and sole) combatant Reserve Component. Finally, would eliminate the basis for ongoing rancor between the Guard and the RA. Instead of media jousting with RA leadership and dividing political centers of support which should be available to both, the NGB would be required to focus on its role as the sole source of Reserve Component combat force structure.

c. Remove the Active Army as the primary coordination focus of resources, force structure, and missions for the NGB, thus providing a basis for these parties to view themselves as separate peers rather than competitors for the identical 'rice bowl'.

d. With the elimination of the controversy as to the identity of the 'primary Reserve Component', the federally chartered USAR, USNR, USMCR, and USAFR could resume their focus of providing immediately available mobilization ready support units or individual augmentees to sustain their respective Active Components.

e. New consideration of efficiencies to promote 'jointness' and the elimination of competitive redundancies could be tested or revisited. Consideration could be given to Speaker Gingrich's often repeated idea of "reducing the Pentagon to a Triangle". This triangulation of

over competitive, redundant bureaucracies could occur by elimination of the service secretariats and replacing them with structures headed by Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Land, Air, and Maritime Forces, respectively. Redundancies between the Army and Marines, or similar ones involving the Navy and Air Force, could be eliminated. More importantly, the hyper competitive secretariat bureaucracies could be pared to just the 'best and brightest'. This generic, downsized DoD whose focus was an efficient, cooperative joint defense structure could then address a truly joint funding paradigm. Non-DoD entities, also laden with their own bureaucracies and overworked field elements (e.g., the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Agency, etc.) could be either eliminated or redirected to a more internally-skewed, domestic mission. In the case of the Coast Guard, consideration should be given to assimilating it into the newly created Naval Militia for international border or riverine operations.

## CONCLUSION

The United States is entering a century in which the nation's leaders will be required to address serious challenges possessing defense-related implications. In addition to traditional issues of threat identification, force structure, and resourcing, challenges involving reduced population growth, increased competition for a smaller pool of educated youth, and spending prioritizations with domestic projects will surface. These issues will rise as a result of a need to restore the nation's infrastructure. They will be less likely to meet funding resistance from elected representatives. To respond, the military departments are comprised of cooperative active and reserve contingents, all supplemented by a technologically proficient, relevant National Guard. They must and be capable of defeating any enemy and/or enforcing any peace. The armed services must be able to execute missions utilizing new methods, more complex

equipment, and with fewer personnel. To do this, new initiatives must be embraced, old ideas, force structures, and funding paradigms reconsidered, and if necessary, totally abandoned. An environment premised on joint cooperation must replace parochial perspectives.

Transparent solutions will not likely succeed in reducing and eliminating the internal competition for missions and force structure between the Active Army and the Guard. The NGB's heavily politicized leadership will probably never accept the Active Army's stated policy motives. Concurrently, the Active Army will not willingly accept the premise of *de facto* autonomy for the NGB which it perceives is the motivation for all current Guard initiatives. The result to date has been to lock step both entities into constant conflict. Each antagonist will dedicate an ever increasing amount of resources, both in funds and political 'influence', in a struggle viewed as self-destructive. The most complete method to end this acrimony is to 'divorce' the parties and require them to refocus on specific missions which do not conflict.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

To facilitate solutions, three proposals should occur: [1] Eliminate the three service secretariats and replace them with Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Land, Sea, and Air Warfare; [2] Create a Naval (and Marine) militia; and [3] Charter the NGB to provide all Reserve Component combat power. These changes will enhanced the importance of the Guard in the nation's joint defense force and will provide it a quantifiable mission, i.e., provide for the homeland defense and control of the nation's borders. These solutions will eliminate the primary reasons for waste.

The advocates for the *status quo* will immediately highlight the perceived shortfalls contained in these proposals. The collective bargaining entities representing the civilian work

forces in the Pentagon can be expected to resist. The Navy should be expected to resist ceding a large portion of their assets to a politically savvy competitor. Further, the Navy should be expected to contend there exists no personnel structure for a Naval Militia and claim the equipment assigned to such an entity is not capable of being manned by a part time force.

These problems are capable of responsive answers. Every military service indicates that it will not suffer readiness shortfalls unless there are more resources dedicated to defense. The last two Presidents, as well as the last four Congresses, have shown no willingness to expand defense spending

Resources necessary to maintain the vibrancy for all services and their respective components must be generated from new efficiencies. The second best alternative (behind an unpopular BRAC process) are those obtained by eliminating redundancies in the secretariats and in DoD as a whole. Many positions which could be eliminated are senior political appointees and flag officers. A leaner, 'purple cloaked' set of flag officers could be assimilated into the staffs of the new Assistant Secretaries as 'rotating' positions among the services.

To answer the allegation that there exists no immediate personnel pool for a 'Naval Militia', this pool could be a portion of the Navy who would be immediately transferred to become a Naval Militia Active/Guard ('AGR') force like their existing ARNG and ANG counterparts. A portion of existing USNR personnel in monthly drill positions could be expected to transfer to the new entity. Until all positions were filled with sufficient participants, Congress could statutorily permit the Chief, NGB to offer officer and enlisted members of the Retired Navy the opportunity to serve (until their statutory maximum retirement date ['MRD']) in a monthly drill status at RC drill pay while also receiving their active duty retired pay. At any

point where a qualified officer or sailor not on the retired rolls became available, the retiree would be returned to fully retired status.

Depending on the size of the state population, the pool of personnel and the availability of servicing ports would determine the locations to be assigned the bulk of ships, airframes, and support functions. It could be expected that heavily populated coastal states would dominate the ranks of this force. However, interior states could be expected to provide personnel for aviation, training, administration, and logistics. Personnel already serving in the ARNG and ANG could theoretically provide some of the duplicated administration, thereby effecting additional savings.

The senior leadership of the NGB would have to immediately reflect this new presence and provide for assimilation of new members into its ranks. Initially, if the Chief, NGB was an Army or Air Force officer, the Vice Chief would be required to be a Naval (or Marine) officer. This officer and any other flag officer personnel requirements could be obtained from the ranks of the USNR and USMCR. Like the Chairmanship of the JCS which is theoretically open to officers of any of the armed services, the Chief and Vice Chief of the NGB could be rotated among the three major components represented, with the *caveat* that the Chief and Vice Chief positions could not be held by officers from the same two services of their immediate predecessors.

The conceptual result of these restructures would be more robust service entities, regular and reserve, which are structurally less competitive and possess definable, separate missions. Each would coordinate its funding from a Defense Department comprised of civilian assistant secretaries staffed with non-aligned civilians and 'purple-suited' uniformed members. The senior person with responsibility for uniformed service matters would be its uniformed Chief, or if there was a perception that more centralized control should occur, this role could be granted

the Chairman, JCS. In effect, civilian control of the military would commence at the DoD level instead of the Secretariats. Most importantly, the nation's military requirements would be met by a leaner, efficient force unshackled from parochial competitive urges.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Walter B. LaBerge, Ph.D., "Keeping the United States A Dominant World Power By Maintaining Its Present 2 MRC Capability, 1997, special collections, Institute for Advanced Technology, University of Texas, Austin: p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Uldric L. Fiore, Jr., "THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: DEFENSE Secretariat Reform", 1998, p. 24-31.

<sup>3</sup> Togo D. West, Jr. and Dennis J. Reimer, Jr., "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1998" (February 1997) GPO: p. 30-31.

<sup>4</sup> William S. Cohen, "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review", *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer '97), p. 9-13.

<sup>5</sup> "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", Report of the National Defense Panel (December 1997) GPO: p. iv.

<sup>6</sup> William E. Odom, "Transforming the Military", *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 4 (July/August 1997): p. 61-62.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, "Transforming the Military", p. 54.

<sup>8</sup> Jason Sherman, "Philbin's Confrontation Strategy", *Armed Forces Journal International* (February 1998), p. 19.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Officials Feel Shortchanged by Military Outlays," *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 February 1998, p. \_\_\_\_.

<sup>10</sup> Maxwell D. Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet* (1959), Harper and Brothers, Publishers, p.123.

<sup>11</sup> Sean D. Naylor, "Army gripes over budget lead to IG Investigation," *Army Times*, 2 March 1998, p.2.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, idem, "Army Officials Feel Shortchanged by Military Outlays".

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, idem, "Army Officials Feel Shortchanged by Military Outlays".

<sup>14</sup> Ibid; idem, "Army Officials Feel Shortchanged by Military Outlays."

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., William E. Odom, "Transforming the Military," p. 10-13.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, Report of the National Defense Panel, p. \_\_\_\_.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, Report of the National Defense Panel, p. 23-4.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, "Keeping the United States A Dominant World Power By Maintaining Its Present 2 MRC Capability, 1997: p. \_\_\_\_.

<sup>19</sup> *World Almanac*, 1994, "Energy-Oil and Natural Gas Reserves; Nuclear Electricity, *World Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves, January 1, 1992*", p. 155.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate. *Total Forces Intergration and Reserve Components Equity Act of 1999*. \_\_\_\_ Congress, \_\_\_\_ Session, S.R. \_\_\_\_, Congressional Record, \_\_\_\_, no. \_\_\_\_, daily ed. ([date]): S \_\_\_\_ - S \_\_\_\_.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, "Philbin's Confrontation Strategy": p.19.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, "Philbin's Confrontation Strategy": p.14.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, "Politics By Other Means": p.40.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, \_\_\_\_

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Code. 1984 (as amended). Vol. 10, sec 904.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Code. 1984 (as amended). Vol. 10, secs. 801 et seq.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, "The Conspiracy Theory": p.31.

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